6. Can Turkey be Part of the “Other” Europe?

 “When I moved from Istanbul to Paris, I thought left behind the headscarf debate that divided the nation between Secularists and Islamist for over 200 hundred years. I moved to Paris and I found myself in the middle of same debate. This was very surprising to me, as a non-Westerner, I was expecting to meet with normal progressive things. But this time temporal dimension of the event was disturbing; it was like a clock working in reverse. A “Déjà vu” like experience: I had seen this film before” (Göle 2006b: 3).

Göle summarizes the debate of veil in Europe exacerbating in recent years with those sentences. Headscarf, which occupies Turkey’s agenda for two centuries, has constituted one of Europe’s leading agenda for last 5-6 years. The main differences of headscarf debate between Turkey and Europe is related to the demographic facts, identity and politics: In Turkey, where majority of population is Muslim and %62 of women put on headscarf; headscarf is an issue of majority (Çarkoğlu & Toprak 2006). In Europe, where most of the Muslim is immigrant and most of the immigrants are Muslim, headscarf is a matter of Muslim minority. 
Headscarf debate in Europe is framed in the discourses of multiculturalism, feminism, European identity and European values (Okin 1999, Kukathas 2001, Philips 2001, Saharso 2006, Sauer 2006).  Since multiculturalism is a subtitle in European identity issue and feminism was discussed in previous section, in the last portion of the article, the connection of European identity discourse to headscarf debate in Europe and Turkey’s EU candidacy will be highlighted.

Although headscarf bans in Europe and Turkey’s EU candidacy seem to be two different topics at first sight. If we remember that process of West’s construction of itself as a “dominant subject” over the “other”, headscarf and Turkey are “these others” that Europe define itself in reverse. Therefore, these two topics evoke similar social and political reflexes. Besides, considering Turkey as the heir of Ottoman Empire who sieged Vienna twice, makes her more “other” comparing to other Muslim countries. 

Europe’s re-encounter with its “other”-this time without the self-esteem caused by spatial proximity- in her own home, Europe, can be characterized as a complex déjà vu phenomenon. Paradoxical discourse of Europe about headscarf, Muslims living in Europe and Turkey’s EU candidacy can be read differently in the context of Europe’s identity crisis as a result of challenges to “European dominant subject” in the Eastern and Western hemispheres. The first time that I noticed how Europe manifests almost similar reaction to both Turkey’s EU candidacy and Headscarf was a panel discussion in 2006 in Austria. A Turkish native panelist was talking about headscarf in the context of Turkey’s EU candidacy. Panelist, Aydin Findikci, an associate professor of economics, born in Turkey but living and working in Germany, showing photos of veiled wives of president Abdullah Gul, prime minister Recep Tanya Erdogan and other deputies of ruling AK Party (Justice and Development Party) and trying to convince European scientists and high level bureaucrats that deputies of ruling party (AK Party) violate democracy and involve religion to politics in the process of EU accession. According to him, Turkey has been going through an Islamization process and secularism is at risk. Therefore, Europe must stop negotiation of EU accession with Turkey and should not support ruling party (Fındıkçı 2006: 14). The most important point in this talk was the use of headscarf to ostracize Turkey further. 
Fındıkçı is not alone who uses “headscarf” as “a psychological instrument” to evoke already existing fear related to veil.  Bassam Tibi, a Syrian philosopher who teaches at American and German Universities,   is another figure who argues “Turkey’s accession to Europe would mean access of “headscarf” in Europe. Tibi refers to AKP as “headscarf Party” or “headscarf power” in his book going Europe with Headscarf?  Turkey in EU Path  (2005)(Mit dem Kopftuch nach Europa? – Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union). Desired message is already given on the cover: three headscarfed girls shouting in front of a large crowd. The note about the cover picture is interesting; it says picture is belong Islamist Turks who protest Ariel Sharon’s visit to Turkey in 2001. Considering national-socialist past of European readers, this picture with this footnote creates Turkey-headscarf-anti-Semitism evocations right at the beginning. Tibi criticizes Europe’s support and appreciation of Erdogan’s reforms and emphasizes the mistake of reducing and limiting Turkish Armed Force’s power. (Tibi 2005: 82).

In many occasions, he characterizes headscarf as “the uniform of Islamist” (Tibi 2005: 25, 88, 130); Islamism as the symbol of fanaticism, sexism and anti-secularism.  Just like Findikci’s talk, the main theme of Tibi’s book is “headscarfed” Turkey under ruling AK party can not be part of the Europe.  One of the most frequently used words in the book is “headscarf”. Strangely enough, neither Findikci nor Tibi mentions headscarf ban in Turkish universities since 1998 in spite of ruling “headscarf” AK Party.

Another startling argument in this book is Tibi’s interesting logic about headscarf’s religious base: According to Tibi, lady members of royal family of Jordan and Morocco, which descend from the Prophet, do not put headscarf and they are ok with it. What is it to Erdogan, who is not related to the Prophet that argues veil is mandatory in Islam? Insistence of an ordinary Muslim on the necessity of headscarf in spite of the fact that Prophet's grandsons do not see it as a necessary Muslim religious requirement, is nothing but a fanaticism and radical Islam.  Tibi's question asked immediately after is also interesting: "Why don’t they take their wives to Ahmet Necdet Sezer's invitation and insist on gender discrimination?" (Tibi 2005: 25). 


European identity was studies by a group of researcher in a project. Research findings are highlight under 4 subtitles:
1.    Increasing Individual Religiosity in Europe
2.    Debate about Christian Identity of Europe provoked by Turkey’s EU candidacy
3.    Muslim Immigrants in Europe
4.    Different Attitudes of European Countries toward Islam

This indicates the how the issue of “Muslim in Europe” is important for the debates of European identity. Islam has been ostracized by European for centuries. Now, Islam has become part of the Europe. Because of its visibility and its meaning coming from the past, headscarf of Muslim women constitutes one of the central elements in identity debates.

Let’s look at the findings of the research published in 26-27. Volume of journal called “Transit”: European identity is debated around the issue of “Headscarf in Europe and Islam” and “Turkey’s Accession to Europe”.  The aim of the research is stated by Michalski as following way: 

“Taking lesson from the tragic experiences, democratic European societies spent effort to keep religion out of political life. There is a reason to think religions are dividing not uniting. This situation is still valid today. However, perhaps (European religions AB) can unite people in Europe. In this context, especially, the role of Islam in Europe will be investigated” (Michalski 2003: 5).

Almost All the researchers point to the fact that importance of religion is increasing in Europe just like all over the world (Martin, Hervieu-Leger, Taylor, Göle, Berger). What is at stake here is not going back to church, but “the movement of individualization of religion” (Hervieu-Leger). Göle defines this as the rejection of church and authority of previous generation and people’s “going on their own way” and distancing themselves from institutionalized religion. According to Grace Davie, this new kind of religiosity can be explained as “believing without belonging” (Hervieu-Leger 2003: 104). Hervieu-Leger, on the other hand, argues that the reverse of Davie’s formula is valid in European countries: 

“This formula can be reversed: belonging without believing. From this version, religion may not mean a shared faith, but still constitutes an important part of collective memory and collective identity. And as such, it may explain reflexes of collective identity. Both a Danish who does not believe in God and never joins religious rituals but pay his/her membership due to Lutheran church for the rites of passages (birth-baptism-wedding-funerals); A French, who bemoans after church ceremonies in his childhood and protest building mosques but stops at the church when he dies… both can be example of “believing without belonging” and “belonging without believing” (Daniele Hervieu-Leger 2003: 104).


According to Hervieu Leger, because of Islam’s overwhelming visibility in Europe, Christian conscious of European is increasing. Thus, once again Christianity has become meaningful for European subjects. This situation according to Hervie-Leger may create serious problem in terms of multiculturalism:
“I want to note that Europe’s going back to its religious root can bring serious risks along. (…) Most probably, the real big danger is religion; its regaining meaning as “European heritage”, this may serve as a unifying   factor inside the Europe but the danger is to use it to create outside boundaries. Debates about Turkey’s EU candidacy, when the issue is opening door to a Muslim country (it does not matter how much secular Turkey is), show what kind of cultural, legal and symbolic problems may emerge in the frame of “human rights” issues.” (Hervieu Leger 2003: 116-117)
According to researchers, debates about Turkey’s EU candidacy, especially debates started after 2002 Copenhagen summit in all over the Europe, are related to developing identity of Europe. Göle emphasizes that it is the first time the “meaning of being European” is debated at social level:

“The question of what constitutes European Union?  What is the common ground that union should stand-is it Christian heritage and Western culture or political values that provide multiculturalism and democratic integration- have caused division of the society.  Turkey’s attempt to be part of Europe created some concerns about Islam in European public opinion. It was surprising to observe many politicians, scientists, and individuals wanting the borders of Europe be defined more clearly (Göle 2003: 157).



Another strange thing was some Europeans, while praising Turkey about her unwavering headscarf ban in public space, were against Turkey’s EU membership bid: 

“Those who were against headscarf in French public school were also against Turkey’s EU membership. For them, secularism in Turkey was meaningful just for minority. Knowing this was very difficult for Turks. Also, it was very difficult for European democrats to explain the emerging a strong social opinion that see immigrants and Turks as Muslim “other”. (Göle 2003: 164)


According to Berger, Turkish case contains a painful irony. Because,   in spite of the fact that “European identity” of Republic has been repeatedly emphasized since the time of Kemal Ataturk, after 80 years, Europe is not decided whether to recognize this identity:


 “Europe’s continuing rejection of Turkey’s full membership is officially explained Turkey’s shortcomings about human right issues. However, there are many signs that secular Europe suddenly becomes overly Christian when a Muslim country wants to be part of the European society. The question of whether Turkey is a treat for Western culture or she reminds “white” Christian-European identity is being frequently raised. (…) However, “cultural” criteria that makes Turkey’s acceptance so difficult can not be phrased.  This issue is now becoming more serious with the millions of second generation Turks living in Europe confused between two markedly different identities; half European-half Turkish/Muslim, both with different expectations” (Casanova 2004: 93).

With this assessment of Casanova we now approach the issue of “European Muslims” or “Muslims in Europe”.  In his work, Lord Bhikhu Parekh, a liberal British scientist, challenges a commonly shared conviction of Europeans that “Islam principally conflicts with multicultural democracy and it is a treat for Europe” in the example of Muslim in England.  According to results of his study, Muslims have not caused so far an issue that would treat British democracy. Most of them appear to be adapted to democratic life. However, situation of Muslim youth today does contain potential of violence:
 “There are signs that considerable portion of Muslim youth is increasingly facing to be member of lower class of the society. They tend to drop out the school early; they are either unemployed or work for lower wages. Most of them are involved in illegal activities such as drag trafficking, prostitution and gangs. They are alien to both their parents’ culture and culture of British society. They feel they are victimized and have tendency for anarchist ideas. But, so far they did not upraise against the democratic system.
 
Their discontents can be easily transferred to violence. This transformation can be prevented with sensitive policies that ease their burden and give them enough satisfaction. (…) As I showed, majority of British Muslims is adjusted to democracy and they are not a treat. My findings clearly challenges the conviction that the reason Muslim societies are not democratic is Islam’s incompatibility with democracy, and Muslim’s existence in the West sooner or later will be a treat to democratic structure of Europe. I think this argument is completely wrong”
 (Parekh 2003: 150-151)

Like Parekh, Oberndörfer also points out that economic and social expectation of young Muslims is the most important determining factor of potential violence in the society.  Unless the socioeconomic conditions they live, which are way under the standard, have been improved, they will come closer to political radicalization. According to Casanova, the real igniter is “economic and social marginalization”.  For him, the conflicts about increasing appearance of Islam in Europe are about secularism. Taking lesson from painful experience, Europe has succeeded to limit religion to the “private space”.
Right of religious freedom of individuals is respected but this right has been limited with private space. Religion in public space is not even an issue. The signs that indicate Islamic affiliation such as headscarf can not exist in modern and secular picture of Europe. 

Another difficulty about perceiving Islam as a threat for Europe is the classification of Islam as a “non- European” religion. As Le Pen (French) and Jörg Haider (Austria) argue, Islam as religion of the other “is not wanted in Europe and can not be integrated into Europe” (Casanova 2004). This opinion by determining integration policies of some European countries legalizes restrictive politics:
 

“What determines normal differs from one country to the other.  The fight about Muslim headscarf that is started in several European countries and  recently accepted ban of headscarf and other religious symbols in public schools  by people even by French Muslims on the ground of  protecting “national unity”  can be considered an extreme  example of liberal secularism.(…) What makes this despotism right for secular and liberal majority is not just the principle of democratic majority; it is also  the secular-theological opinion that define a system of norm as reactionary, fundamentalist and anti-modernist  while the other as modern, progressive, and liberal” (Casanova 2004 : 100-101).

As Casanova emphasizes, European countries that take immigrants have different attitudes about religious diversity and religious minorities. Increasing visibility of Islam both unite and divide European countries. They seems to united about the potential challenges and conflicts that they  all face about increasing visibility of Islam, but they are divided about how to deal with these challenges strategically based on dominated politic culture in those countries:

“The different attitudes expressed toward headscarf or veil in school shows that Islam has become a fact in Europe that both unites and divides European countries” (Hervieu-Leger 2003: 109).


7. Result

As stated in the beginning of this paper, headscarf in Europe is at the stage of “defining the problem”. Carol Lee Bachii points out that during the defining of problem, some certain aspects of problem are highlighted and framed and thus  certain social and political solutions are implemented(Bachii, 1999). Alternative discourses and frameworks with quite different solutions are not voiced. In other words, according to Bachii, once a problem is defined in a certain way, it is very difficult to frame it in another way. For this reason, what is defined as a “problem” in political discourse is very important to determine political measures and practices. Therefore, Bachii argues that what is defined as problem and what is not in the discourse must be questioned. Considering this, researchers in social sciences should notice voiceless actors in the discourse and focuses on their frame and problem definitions.

Moving from Bachii’s argument, it is obvious that the direction of headscarf debate will be determined by how the problem is defined. Different frames of two conflicting sides in the headscarf debate in Turkey are grouped by Aksoy (2005: 16) as following way:

Secular Discourse                Islamic Discourse

The Name of Debate                       Turban                                   Headscarf

Why the Cover                                Political Symbol             Religious requirement

Manifestation/Legal Defense      against Secularism          Freedom of Religion 

(Since it provides only two extreme version of the argument, Aksoy’s table can be criticized.  For instance, when we consider liberal argument this table would be much extended. However, in spite of this limitation, this table is very useful to illustrate how these two extreme sides differ in their definition of the problem and its solution).
If the “Problem» is defined as “turban”, an anti-secular symbol,  the suggested solution will be “headscarf ban” justified with arguments such as peer pressure, gender discrimination, and lack of a clear verses in Qur’an about “turban”.  However, if “headscarf ban” is defined as “problem” and supported with arguments such as freedom of religion, right of education,  and marginalization of certain parts of the society,  solution will be removal of ban not veil.

If the access of those who offer different solution is blocked  to enter discourse at the stage of defining the problem, enforced solution would be implemented as only alternative (Bachii, 1999). This is how headscarf ban in Turkey has persisted for many years. This is the most important aspect distinguishes headscarf debates in Europe from headscarf ban in Turkey.

Even though it is a difficult and bumpy road, those who are related to this debate and have something to say can make their voice herd if they want and can be part of discourse.

Even, we can argue that those groups complaining about violations of their right in Europe are lazy enough to do lobbying activity to make a case about their problems.  Because, in Europe decision making process works through lobbying activities. 

The main problem about headscarf ban is that veiled women, who are the subject of this injustice, are not involved in the process of the definition of the problem at academic, political and even social level. As a result, they can’t fully make their voice herd. Many factors such as luck of foreign language, educational level, experience and knowing the system can be held responsible for this. However, these excuses can be over come (has already been overcome by some veiled women activist) by headscarfed women. Tough coming from lower-limited income families, many veiled women have learned one or two foreign languages in recent years. Many of them have been trying to improve themselves to overcome what limits them. However, there is a resistance in the system itself, out of their control that refuses their involvement in the discourse. To overcome this is not as easy as to improve their skills.

 This basic resistance that blocks headscarfed women’s involvement in the debate about them is the psychological, political, social and even scientific outcomes of the Western subject- Eastern object constriction. Right from the beginning, because of her visibility, headscarfed woman has been at the center of the West-East construction process of Orientalist discourse. Compared European male subject, she is a very explicit other in the discourse because of her cultural, gender, and religious differences.

In addition to scientific and political competencies, their attempt to question their position of ‘object’ necessitates improvement of their talents to cope with emotional difficulties.  Because they are the other of the system both in Turkey and in Europe.  Dialogue with the other always contains potential of emotional conflict. Improving Lungwitz’s 5 basic emotions, Machleidt and Wolf created a model called “foreign other” to explain immigrants and Europeans approach to each other. When one approaches a stranger following basic feelings emerge in order:
1.    Curiosity/ Interest
2.    Fear/Anxiety
3.    Aggression/ Pain
4.     Sadness/ Sorrow
5.    Happiness / Satisfaction


Thus, the process of approaching the stranger starts with curiosity and interest and when the process is completed, it reaches to a success with happiness and satisfaction. Steps in between fear, aggression and sadness provide depth and stability to the relationship.
 When approaching stranger, before coming to face to face, first we have fear because of not knowing what is waiting for us, later, during the first stages of encounter fear becomes aggression (Machleidt & Wolf 1998). If we keep on the relationship, next emotion will be sadness. Finally, mutual introduction recognition and negotiation bring happiness, satisfaction and achievement. 



Relationship between immigrants and European can be read through this lens:
The cut off the process because of aggression and sadness, emotional stage of early encounter, causes withdrawal of immigrants and creation of parallel communities. In the context of headscarf ban/debate in both Turkey and Europe, headscarfed women everyday encounter with the other and experience the emotional stages of fear, aggression and sadness. Approaching the other is a two sided action. If one side does not have curiosity and interest, other emotional stages may cut off or ends in a vicious circle. In this case, it is the task of headscarfed women to break this vicious circle.

Homi Bhabha criticizes Edward Said because of his Orientalism theory ignores the conflicting structure of Western subject and Eastern object and reduces whole system to a binary structure.  According to him, by accepting a binary structure between ruling colonials and ruled colonies, Said does not leave room for dialogue and resistance. In reality, representations of East in Western discourse occurs as objectification of the other for longing, desire and mockery; there is a state of productive ambivalence against the other (Castro Varela & Dhawan 2005: 86) (NOTE: there is a problem in this paragraph, there is an ambivalence here, but this is because of its Turkish origin. Translator). According to Bhabha, Colonial discourse continues in modernist discourse in the global world (Bhabha 2007).

In a conference in Vienna in October 2007, Bhabha emphasized that individual ambivalences are increasing as a result of globalization. According to Bhabha, when this ambivalence reaches to a maximum level conscious turns into moral conscious and deepens individual’s thinking and reflection skill. Thus, a potential of an individual performance emerges and push individuals to develop concept in order to change the situation.
No other word than paradox can describe headscarfed women’s deprive of education and work (and thus, participation in social life) right as a result of headscarf ban in modern liberal and democratic world of 21st century.  As an individual, headscarfed woman is surrounded with intertwined ball of contradictions.  The stages of ‘paradox-reflection-conceptualization’ have been experienced by many headscarfed women in Turkey and in Europe in individual and collective level.

In recent years, the effort of increasing number of headscarfed young girls to study abroad in spite of financial and non-financial limitations can illustrate an individually developed concept. An example to a collective level of solution is the Civil Societies (NGOs) trough  which  headscarfed women fight against headscarf bans; Active participation of Woman Platform  of Capital City  (Başkent Kadın Platformu) in national and international women movements (Başkent 2007; www.baskentkadin.org), a recently published survey called ‘Covered Reality of Turkey’  conducted by HAZAR group (HAZAR 2007; www.hazargrubu.org), AKDER’s project of providing opportunity of education in abroad for headscarfed students (www.akder.org) , again,  AKDER’s continuing struggle  for rights in national and international platforms of law and human rights (Benli 2005). In addition to headscarf problem, each one of these associations has involved in the process of developing solution about other violations of woman rights such as violence against women and honor killing.  When we look at the increasing efforts at individual and NGO level, the actors of headscarf struggle- characterized as “the longest civil society struggle of Turkey” by Gülay Göktürk (Özkan 2005) - have already started to question the discourse with the experience accumulated from the growing up in headscarf bans.  Whether they overthrow the role of being object and achieve the position of subject will be witnessed in coming years ahead. It is important that headscarfed woman activists should understand the status of headscarf in the process of mutual constructions of subject and object in order to change the direction of the discourse. Because, according to the most basic rule of discourse, “knowledge is power” (Adorno & Horkheimer 1979).

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